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Confucius: The Traditionalist As Visionary* 
by Todd S. Herwig 
It seems only fair to ask if selected aphorisms of a man deceased for some 
2000-odd years can possibly be of use to us today. It is easy to look at the 
technological advances of the last thirty years and feel certain that the develop-
ments since the time of Confucius have left us only with a few scant biological 
similarities to the people of his time. But to look at the world through these 
lenses is to confuse technological progress with human progress; after close 
examination of humankind's general situation we may be much more tempted 
to think, "The more things change, the more they stay the same." It is for this 
reason that Confucius is perhaps more topical today than ever before. 
Base instincts (tendencies such as selfishness, vanity, etc.) are always easier 
to give into than their more virtuous opposites are to achieve. How often have 
we seen that the "lower" a person is willing to sink (that is to say, the more of 
their morality they are willing to sacrifice) the more likely they are to achieve 
their goals -whether they be money, power or even the Presidency? It was in 
Confucius's day as it is now and may always be: rulers "were in historical fact 
too often arbitrary and power-mad,"1 and their lack of virtue set the tone for 
their subjects and those also competing with them for power. "The sacred 
bonds of lineage ... had largely lost their hold, as had the bonds of loyalty, "2 and 
consequently the political and ethical realms (Confucius thought the two to be 
ultimately inseparable) were in twin states of rapid decline. 
Was Confucius's world truly collapsing around him, as much of the histori-
cal data and Confucius's own dialogue would seem to indicate? Yes and no. 
Confucian scholar Herbert Fingarette states, "In short, what Confucius's idiom 
and imagery portray as the increasing chaos of a civilization in course of degen-
eration was, in fact, the inevitable disorder attendant upon the evolution of a 
new, larger and greater single society out of the various older, smaller, cultur-
ally separate and more primitive and provincial groups."3 Confucius's world 
was becoming rapidly smaller - much like our own - and he fought to devise 
a way of addressing the frustrations typical of "growing pains." Interestingly 
• This is the first chapter of Herwig's as yet untitled senior thesis. His advisors are Prof. Monte Hull and 
Prof. Lou Lombardi. 
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enough, as we shall see, Confucius sought to reverse this decline with an ethics 
which has at its core the principle which may be the lone universal in the 
world's sphere of ethics. Unfortunately, most of his attempts to convert local 
rulers to the Tao (the Way) as he saw it, were unsuccessful; in light of what 
Confucius's Tao entails, it is not difficult to see why. Most of the rulers whom 
Confucius met with came to power through sheer force and were motivated by 
the very base instincts which Confucius argued against in his teachings.4 
In order to better understand what Confucius's Tao entails, we must first 
describe the foundations upon which it is built; there is no better place to start 
than with the concept of person-making, and to make sense of person-making 
. the person must be seen against the backdrop of their respective culture. For 
Confucius, culture is the natural outgrowth of the community of man, i.e. 
civilization, and is the primary influence on values, modes of thought, and 
assumptions. But what is "culture?" More than anything else, we must see it 
as a product of norms for work and thought within a community; these prod-
ucts take forms such as language, art, and ritual. The language, arts, and 
rituals which a society weaves through interaction with itself not only give it a 
means of distinction, but become matters of "social habit;"S out of these habits 
grow accepted norms for civilized, participatory, social intercourse,6 which is 
the backbone of a central Confucian concept: li [rite]. A person is to "make" 
him-/herself by drawing on the various traditions of culture and perfecting 
their performance so as to make social intercourse as graceful and dignified as 
possible. Because a community is the sum of its individual parts, the process 
of many individuals "making" themselves is of central import the "making" 
and renewing of the culture's social fabric.? 
Grasping what exactly Confucius meant by li is perhaps the most impor-
tant step in understanding Confucius's Tao, but it makes sense to explain the 
Tao, li and jen, another core concept, simultaneously - so as to see their 
interrelatedness. Li, as we have stated earlier, is usually translated as "rite," 
though "ceremony" is often used as well, and either of these is fine for an 
abbreviated treatment. But the best description of li is something closer to 
"rules for civilized, social interaction. "8 Under these rules, one's correct 
prescribed behavior in a given situation is determined by the roles of those 
participating in the interaction;9 for instance, a father would act differently 
toward a son than toward his ruler. The chief significance of li is that, in 
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addition to acting as a living warehouse for things cultural, it serves as cultural 
law for human relationships with normative rules for action based on the roles 
persons perform. Because all people within a culture are raised conforming to 
these rules, societal interaction is smooth and predictable, yet still retains a 
measure of spontaneity reflecting each individual's unique performance during 
interaction. 
The Tao, which is usually translated as "the Way," denotes the "Confucian 
commitment to a single, definite order" the alternative to which is chaoslO -
however, the only things which seem legitimately "definite" about the Tao are 
some of the chief characteristics which must be present for it to be realized. 
But what is perhaps most ironic about the translation "the Way" is that there 
is no "destination" per se to reach. Confucius seems to describe the Tao 
mostly in riddles, but it is clear that it is the condition of being an ideal-state 
human being, complete in adherence to Ii and with the best interests of all 
humankind in one's heart. The struggle to achieve and maintain this condition 
is a neverending battle which ends only with one's passing away. 
Perhaps, though, it is only in light of the final, fundamental piece of the 
puzzle that we can understand all three concepts in their true light. [en, which 
has been translated variously as "the Good," "the all-inclusive virtue," "hu-
manity," and "benevolence," amongst other things, must I think be thought of 
as all of these things simultaneously to do it justice. This much seems certain 
of jen, whereas "Ii also refers to the particular act in its status as exemplifica-
tion of invariant norm [within a role]; jen refers to the act as expressive of an 
orientation of the person, as expressing his commitment to act as prescribed by 
li."11 [en is also a state of mind and body in which one develops the desire to 
be in harmony with the Way. A host of virtues lend themselves to the pursuit 
of jen-ness, and we shall discuss those later, but let it suffice for now to say 
that the jen person (the "gentleman") has used li (rite) in order to move from 
the raw, unnurtured state he/she was born into to a condition closer to the 
ideal (Tao) state that represents the perfection of humanity. In choosing to 
undertake this long, arduous journey towards human perfection, one has al-
ready taken the first steps towards being jen; achieving jen is not a question of 
insufficient strength but the will to use one's strength.12 
In trying to understand the traditional nature of Ii (on which the whole 
system is constructed), the historical context of Confucius's time must be kept 
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at the forefront of our attention. One aspect of li for which this is especially 
true is the deference to elders which so characterized and defined relationships 
in terms of authority and respect in Confucius's day. In the context of our 
situation today, two chief factors which could conceivably influence the 
amount of respect we hold for a given individual are their level of experience 
and level of education. Experience, in its general sense, would seem more or 
less directly related to age - so it seems only logical to show respect for expe-
rience on a level relative to age. Education, in its formal, general sense, would 
seem related to years spent in school or otherwise formally, actively learning 
- but this follows no rhyme or reason in regards to an easily identifiable unit 
of measure such as age. In Confucius's day, because almost no one had any 
formal education (and those that did were almost always members of the noble 
class looked up to by the common people anyway), experience was the only 
major influence determining respect, so respect for those more advanced in 
years follows a certain kind of practical reason. Today, children often acquire 
more formal education than do their parents, so respect on that level seems 
less automatic; but this situation did not arise in Confucius's day, so conse-
quently we must put it out of our mind and appreciate the reasons for tradition 
as it was. 
Obligations of respect were compounded (again, under li) with obligations 
towards others "in proportion to the benefit received from them,"13 and this 
almost certainly meant considerable obligations to members of one's own 
family. The obligations shared between members of one's family- the lowest 
common denominator among all members of society - Confucius made the 
basis of the general morality.14 In light of this, is it at all surprising that politi-
cal allegiance had familial allegiance as its foundation? 15 The family provided, 
in keeping with practicality and li, a system of upwardly-directed respect 
which all could relate to; and because the ruler was also simply fulfilling a role 
as prescribed in li, the people were obliged to show allegiance to him. This 
will not be the last instance we see where tradition/Ji appears to have practical 
foundations, either. The result is a system that is predictable (i.e., in keeping 
with li), prescribes duties for all in relation to one another's readily perceivable 
social roles, and which everyone has a relation to via their own life's experi-
ences (which makes it very easy for the common person to subscribe/adhere 
to). This system has obvious benefits. 
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As was alluded to above, the subject ('common person", translated from 
min) is not the only person who must fulfill duties prescribed by li; in fact, the 
ruler is the person with the proportionally greatest number of obligations to 
fulfill. In keeping with this level of responsibility, Confucius advises the ruler 
to see himself as a father to his people16 - this will not only give both he and 
his subjects a means by which to relate to him, but will help define the solemn 
nature of his task at hand. Like children, subjects have a variety of needs, 
which the ruler must provide for. 
The most basic of these needs is the general welfare of the min, though, 
interestingly enough, this welfare extends beyond the mere provision of mate-
rial goods to include such intangibles as the ability to trust the ruler. In fact, 
when asked to rank (in order of importance) the needs of the people, trust of 
the ruler wins out over food and arms; Confucius says, 'For from old death has 
been the lot of all men; but a people that no longer trusts its rulers is lost 
indeed." 17 If trust is the most important thing which a ruler must provide for 
his people, then the next most important intangible would have to be his own 
good moral example. 
Trust and meeting the immediate physical needs are most important for 
establishing some semblance of order, but without the proper exemplary be-
havior of the ruler the sophistication which culture has begun to bring to the 
people cannot be sustained. Confucius's statement that, "The common people 
[min] may be made to follow it (the Way) but may not be made to understand 
it,"18 underscores the all-encompassing leadership role which he felt the ruler 
needed to fulfill. Again, the parental imagery is applicable here: the ruler 
serves as a father in giving his children (the min) the morality which they need 
for virtuous social intercourse; without it, societal progress, harmony, and 
order come to a close. Confucius operates under the assumption that the ruler 
sets the tone (moral and otherwise) for his empire, if the min see that lawless-
ness and dishonorable actions go unpunished or even encouraged by the powers 
at be (and remember that li teaches the people to look upward for guidance), 
then this will become the norm throughout the empire. [Analects: II:l9, XII:l 7, 
19, 22, XIII:6] 
Being constantly wise and virtuous in the position of ruler may seem too 
much of a task for one mere mortal, but Confucius does not think that it need 
be so; in fact, if the ruler is truly adept he will have to do very little, for his 
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empire will virtually run itself if he merely "face[s] south."19 Obviously mere 
facing south will not help the empire, but here Confucius uses it as a metaphor 
for following Ii (facing south was considered ritually appropriate for the ruler). 
In addition, the ruler should take particular care to surround himself with 
ministers who also are jen, as they will be seen as extensions of him and must 
carry forth his plans to the min. 
Very little is said about how much virtue the min need for the Tao to 
prevail in a given state - presumably the more the better. This much seems 
certain: one, because it is a common theme in The Analects that the people 
will behave jen-ly if their leaders do, it seems only logical to think that the 
people will behave jen-ly in proportion to the degree of virtue they sense in the 
behavior of their leaders; and two, enough virtue should be present (ideally) so 
that the empire runs itself. Confucius's notions about shame (ch'ih), which 
can only be cultivated through some sense of virtue, underscore this senti-
ment. Shame is but one example (and will have to suffice for the purpose of 
our discussion here) of a virtuous characteristic necessary for the Tao to prevail 
in a state. Confucius's sentiment is: 
Guide them [min] by edicts, keep them in line with punishments, and the common 
people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Guide them by virtue, 
keep them in line with rites, and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform 
themselves.20 
Confucius, while not averse to using punishment as a last resort (if the wrong-
doer will only understand that means of dissuasion), does not see it in the 
Western sense of clearing a "moral debt."21 Not only does he see punishment 
as being less effective than shame, but shame - which is the perception of 
failing in the duties of one's role - should ideally lead to self-reeducation to 
overcome the previous defect in one's actions. Thus, if a ruler has cultivated 
virtue by setting a virtuous example through his own actions, the min should 
acquire a sense of shame and therefore be able to reeducate themselves (as 
opposed to requiring the government to reeducate them); this is plainly a more 
efficient and utopic situation for both ruler and subject alike. 
To summarize, then, what are the most important features of a government 
in keeping with the Tao? First, the ruler must provide for the needs of his 
people; while these definitely include the physical things necessary for survival 
30 
- such as food, shelter and arms - a basis for trust between him and his 
people is preeminent. After all, "[The] rectification or cultivation of virtue can 
be brought about only after the satisfaction of the fundamental necessities of 
life ... are uniformly stressed. "22 Secondly, a ruler must always be cognizant of 
the fact that he is an example to all of his subjects - even his educated minis-
ters; he alone sets the "tone," moral and otherwise, for his government and 
state. Third, the ruler is the chief treasurer of the traditions of his culture. In 
acting in accordance with Ii he passes down the culture to those below him 
(i.e., the min); "facing south" is but a metaphor for promoting Ii and letting 
these rules for social interaction do the real work of attending to the kingdom. 
Lastly, the ruler must succeed in giving some notion of virtue - of right and 
wrong - to his subjects; if he should accomplish this (and Ii, the system of 
cultural traditions and rules for social interaction, should help him immensely) 
then his state should be able to run itself, for the most part. As was evidenced 
in the discussion of shame (ch'ih), government runs much more efficiently 
when the people can "police" themselves. D. C. Lau's statement that, "The 
sole test of a good ruler is whether he succeeds in promoting the welfare of the 
common people, "23 hardly seems revealing to us at first, but some Confucian 
notions about what constitutes "welfare" seem quite progressive and innova-
tive even today. 
There remains only one piece of the Confucian Tao left to be discussed, and 
that involves describing the features and traits of the jen man ("gentleman") 
more completely. This section was left until now because I think that the jen 
man's characteristics only make sense in light of what has been described 
above. Just as becoming jen is the climax of a person's life, so too it must be 
seen as the climax of this chapter and of all Confucian thought in general, I 
believe. 
A couple of things must be said at the outset of our discussion of the jen 
man/gentleman. First, in contrast to Western ethical philosophy, most of 
which prides itself on its applicability to the entire spectrum of humanity 
(from prince to pauper), Confucius's earlier statement about the common 
people being able to follow the Way but not understand it24 speaks volumes. 
Confucius has no delusions that real jen-ness is for everybody; many will 
achieve degrees of virtue, but at best only a few will attain jen 's complete state. 
The fact that Confucius admits to never having met either a Sage (the highest 
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ideal, seen only in figures of antiquity) or a Good Man25 (a truly enlightened 
despot, the next highest ideal) only confirms this. However, and this I think 
reinforces the idea that the pursuit of jen is what is important rather than 
attainment of its ultimate state, the realistically ideal moral character is the 
. gentleman - and Confucius mentions him in more than 80 chapters of The 
Analects.26 In light of the difficulty of being jen, then, we must always re-
member that this is really intended as an ethics for the privileged and enlight-
ened few. 
Lastly, in order to give the virtues expected of the jen man "their fullest 
realization" a gentleman must take part in government.27 Realizing that most 
jen men will, at best, reach the ministerial ranks, as was evidenced earlier, the 
ministers are still a particularly important part of the government because 
their actions represent the ruler. It is due to this that they must possess a 
number of critical virtues vital to carrying out this function. Let us turn our 
attention now to the virtues critical to the making of the jen man, all the while 
remaining aware of the fact that jen is a state of mind and therefore not achiev-
able by qualities alone. 
First of all, "A gentleman, in his plans thinks of the Way; he does not think 
how he is going to make a living"28; that is to say, a jen man has more impor-
tant, lofty concerns than making money. If the Way prevails in his state, the 
ruler should provide for a person's basic needs and thus contribute to an atmo-
sphere in which the pursuit of jen can have a person's full attention. Where 
profit is a person's objective they will justify anything to achieve its procure-
ment, but the nature of jen makes it such that nothing should be sacrificed for 
it, but whatever sacrifices are called for will adversely affect no one else. 
Second, reliability and accuracy in speech (hsin)29 are considered major 
virtues. "Not to carry out a resolution is to fail to be hsin; to have a statement 
not borne out by facts .. .is equally to fail to be hsin. "30 Confucius's general 
advice is to be quick to act but slow to speak.31 [see 1:14, IV:24, IX:24] 
Third, reverence (ching) is a virtue which describes the frame of mind a 
person would have if taking part in a ceremony.32 The following description of 
ching, by D. C. Lau, bears a striking resemblance to the nature of li in that it is 
preoccupied with fulfilling the duties of certain roles: 
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Ching .. .is born of awareness of the immensity of one's responsibility to promote the 
welfare of the common people. It is a combination of the fear of failing in the responsi-
bility one is charged with and the solemn single-mindedness towards the satisfactory 
discharging of that responsibility.33 
Fourth, the virtues of wisdom/intelligence (chih) and courage (yung) are 
important to jen.34 Not only does the wise person know almost intuitively 
what right and wrong are in a given situation, but he is a good judge of charac-
ter as well.35 [see XII:22] Courage is a double-edged sword, and thus must be 
used in the pursuit of jen (or some other such noble pursuit) to be a virtue; but 
it is indispensable to the gentleman in seeing through his goal of becoming 
jen.36 [see XVII:23) 
Fifth, hsiao (the respect and love owed to one's parents) is of prime import 
because, " ... [Being) a good father will also make a good ruler. Love for people 
outside one's family is looked upon as an extension of the love for members of 
one's own family."37 
But the most important virtue of all - and what I have come to believe is 
the guiding principle of Confucius's morality, if not all morality - is jen itself, 
which is often translated as benevolence. What then, is the most important 
trait of benevolence? "Do not do to others what you would not like your-
self. "38 In most Confucian texts this is referred to as mutuality and 
reciprocality, but most Westerners will recognize it by its more biblical desig-
nation: it is the Golden Rule. If we constantly keep at the forefront of our 
minds the way in which we would like to be treated ourselves, how can our 
outlook be anything but good in dealing with those around us? If we realize 
that our own welfare is interdependent on the welfare of others (and vice 
versa)39 we have indeed reached a notable milestone in the history of human 
development. This is particularly important to the ruler and his ministers 
because they are charged with providing for the welfare of the people - what 
better maxim to use in governing fairly, justly, and in keeping with In 
These are the most important virtues characteristic of the jen man, though 
this is by no means to say that no other virtues are necessary, au contraire. 
Nevertheless, as pertains to these virtues, what remains is for the jen man to 
see them and implement them in accordance with Ii. But what about tradition 
and the rules for social interaction - do all of these rites waste many of the jen 
man's virtues by binding and confining the him to old-fashioned ways of ad-
dressing problems to the exclusion of creative, new approaches? I think not. 
We have already discussed the value of Ii -by having normative rules for 
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social interaction which take into account the distinctiveness of our culture 
we emerge from and break with the world of mere animals. In keeping with 
this, Ii is the bridge between humans in their unnurtured state and the ideal 
state (in harmony with the Tao) which they can aspire to; it is "the great 
civilizer." We must also remember that as each participant in Ii "derives 
meaning and value" from it, they simultaneously strengthen and develop Ii 
(yes, develop tradition) by their contribution of 'novel meaning and value. "40 
Would it make sense for Confucius to use Ii to bind us to traditionally paradig-
matic ways of addressing problems if he wanted us to continue to evolve into 
more perfect human beings? I think not. 
Lastly, what I would also point out about The Analects is that Confucius's 
approach is obviously very general. While he does give a certain sense about 
many concepts, the construction and compilation of his collected sayings is 
appropriately unfocused; that is to say, it follows little rhyme or reason. fen is 
discussed throughout, as are many other ideas, rather than in specific books 
designed to convey all there is to know about each concept. This is in stark 
contrast to the neo-logical and organized fashion in which most Western 
ethical texts are organized; this belies their posture as all-knowing, "this-
settles-it-once-and-for-all" works, which typically outline a very specific path 
to be taken in order to achieve Truth. It was Confucius's genius to sketch a 
picture of what virtues and qualities the political leader of the future would 
need, yet remain timeless enough in his scope to assume that with these 
qualities a person could be expected to display proper innovation when neces-
sary to deal with problems as he encountered them. By having a particularly 
acute sense of his own culture, the gentleman could not only be a good judge as 
to what would work with his people, but his sense of Ii would serve as a valu-
able history as well. We must know where we have been to see where we are 
going, and Confucius's jen man would be more than acutely aware of this; 
consequently there is no better qualified leader for the future. 
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